

Concerning the Case of taking the New Oath of FEALTY and ALLEGIANCE With a DECLARATION, &c.

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THE Gentlemen concerned in this Case, professing still to adhere to the Doctrines formerly Professed and Practised in our Church, they cannot take it for a begging of Principles, if we reason with them on those same Principles which themselves have formerly owned, and which they are unwilling to have it so much as thought they have deserted. It will therefore concern them to consider whether their Old Notions be any way consistent with this New Declaration?

The Declaration is, that they Conceive, That all that the Oath obliges them to, is to live peaceably under the present Government. If they will mean fairly and sincerely, they must necessarily intend Two things: 1. That, Though they do not think themselves obliged to be active in Maintaining the Government in its present possession, in Opposition to the *K. de jure*, yet they promise at least, not to disturb the Government in possession, and therefore never to be active in Assisting even the *K. de jure*, against it. That they must mean this, if they mean veraciouly, is plain from the whole design of imposing this New Oath, in our present Circumstances, which is, with a particular and a principal regard to the *K. de jure*, that the Swearers may secure the Possessors in Opposition to him. And the Oath is designedly contrived in such general terms as may reach all the Cases that may fall out during the whole life of the *K. de jure*, at least whilst his Competitors are living also. And therefore the Swearers must mean, not only as present, but neither also for the future, to assist the *K. de jure* against his present Compe-

titors, if they will mean what is expected from them by the Imposers of the Oath, that is, if they will mean really, as in honesty they ought to be presumed to mean. And 2. They must intend not only to abstain from real disturbances of the Peace (for that might be consistent with endeavours to restore the *K. de jure*, as the only means of settling a Peace on solid and lasting Foundations) but from such things also as shall be called and voted disturbances of the Peace by the present Possessors. For the design of the Oath being to satisfy the Possessors, the Swearers ought to mean it so, as that it may in reason give them the satisfaction desired by it. But the Interpretation of the Oath by any others can never be meant by the Imposers. And it certainly belongs to the Party concerned to interpret promises made to satisfy himself, especially when he is a Governour. Then it may be presumed notorious what is meant by breaking the Peace. That is, whatsoever it may be expected will be judged a breach of Peace by them who are already possessed of all the Legal Tribunals in the Execution of those Laws which were never designed by the Legislators, for the support of the Government *de Facto*, which were not also *de Jure*.

If therefore the Swearers can indeed and veraciouly mean these things now mentioned, I shall then confess that they may *bona fide* take the Oath with the annexed Declaration.

But it will then deserve a further enquiry whether the Duty of their former Oaths be consistent with such a meaning. That is, Whether their Oaths to the *K. de jure* be con-

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istent with a Neutrality? that is, Whether they do not oblige them to be Active in contributing towards his Restauration? For we have now to deal as I said, with such persons as own themselves still obliged by their former Oaths. Such all must be who stand by Bp. *Sanderfon's* Principles, so much magnified by them who differ extremely from him in their Application. And such must All be who stand by the Practices of our Fathers in *Cromwell's* days, who did not think that either *Cromwell's* Possession, or *K. Ch's* disability to protect them, did any way excuse them from their Obligations to *K. Ch. the II.* though neither he had taken any Coronation Oath to them, nor they any Oath to Him, otherwise than he was included in the Lawful Successors of his Royal Ancestors to whom they had Sworn. Let us therefore see whether these former Oaths did not Oblige them who took them, to be Active for the Interests of the Prince to whom they were made. If they did, Two things will thence follow against the sense of these Swearers: 1. That these New Oaths being made to our New Possessors with the same design, and in the same sense of the words already known from ancient Practice, must also oblige them to be Active for our present Possessors, which themselves will not excuse from Perjury, if the action be particularly designed against the *K. de Jure*. 2. That, on the same parity of Reasoning, the same Oaths being made to the excluded *K. de Jure*, will also oblige Swearers to be Active for him, which must necessarily oblige them to do that which the Possessors will certainly judge inconsistent with what they have Sworn to them, that is, with living peaceably under their Government.

And if we were to decide this Question by the Practice and Precedent of our Church in the last Case, that now mentioned one of *Cromwell*; it seems plain, that our Brethren then thought their Oaths to the Royal Family obliged them to be Active, when a favour-

able occasion should serve, and not only to bare Neutrality. What should otherwise have hindered them from taking the Engagement, when they might thereby have so much bettered their own condition in this world, if they might have done it without prejudicing their condition in the next? The same pretences that are made use of now, were as truly applicable then. The Government was then also already settled without *K. and House of Lords*, without any Sin of the Royal Party, from whom this security was required for the future. *K. Ch. the II.* was as unable to protect them as *K. J. II.* is now. The probability of their being likely to be in any Capacity of Contributing to the Restauration with any likelihood of success, was then as little as it is now. And therefore, supposing that to be the only Case wherein the Actual Obligation of their Oaths for active Contribution would return, as many of them do suppose; yet the taking of the Engagement had been much less Culpable than the taking of This present Oath is now. The only Condition that can make it lawful for us to promise we will never do that which, in some Circumstances we think our selves obliged to do, can only be the assurance we have at the making of the Promise, that those Circumstances which may reduce the Obligation shall never return upon us. And therefore by how much the more or less probable the returning of those Circumstances is, by so much the more a Promise or an Oath not to do what in those Circumstances we are obliged to do, will also be more or less excusable. But whilst the Controversie is depending, whilst the Right is on Legal (and Ch. of Engl.) Principles, unquestionable there can be no excuse for Promising or Swearing not to do that which, in so little and not unlikely a change of Circumstances, we may notwithstanding think our selves obliged to do.

They say indeed, and say truly that even their former Oaths could not oblige them

to Impossibilities; That even the Legislators and Imposers of them cannot in reason be presumed to have obliged the Subject to an active assistance that should certainly ruine himself without any probability of being Serviceable to the Government; that therefore there can be no obligation for single Subjects to oppose a *K. de facto*, who is once established in a full and compleat Possession; that in such a case it must therefore be lawful to live quietly, that when it is lawful to live so, it must also be lawful to Promise and to Swear to live so. This Reasoning would indeed be very good, if the Promise and the Oath extended no further than the Case supposed in the Argument, that is, if their Promise and Oath were no longer to forbear active endeavours to restore the *K. de jure*, then their endeavours were destitute of any prospect of any probability of Success, or of any other publick advantage that might make amends for the hazard to which they must thereby necessarily expose themselves. But if they would speak out, and express the limitation intended, how could they expect that such a taking the Oath could ever be accepted by the Imposers? Why should they thank them for Swearing no more than what they must have been obliged to, though they had never sworn it, by the dictates of common prudence, and their natural concernment for their own preservation. Why should they thank them for qualifying themselves for favours by seeming theirs when there was no need of them, and at the same time owning an Obligation to leave and betray them in the very Case in prospect of which the Oath it self was designed, that is, in the time of danger, and danger from that very Enemy against whom the Imposers expected to be secured by this Oath? If they go no further than the case supposed, they can never give the Government *de Facto* that security that is expected. If they Swear and Promise more, that will be more than they can justify

by their own Principles, who both suppose their former Oaths to remain as obligatory now as ever, and to require more than an indifferent Neutrality, and to require active Endeavours for restoring the *K. de jure*, when ever they may attempt it with any probability of Success. Such, though they do not think themselves obliged to endeavour it at present, yet cannot promise, much less Swear, that for the future, they will never endeavour it.

This was the sense of our Ancestors, and is the sense of our Brethren, with whom we are at present dealing. But we will not oblige them to continue any longer of the same mind than their own Principles oblige them. Let us therefore see whether their other Principles do not oblige them to believe the Inconsistency of their present and their former Oaths. Indeed, if by living peaceably they mean no more than Non-opposition, a perfect Neutrality would satisfy the Oaths on both sides, both to the *K. de facto* and to the *K. de jure* also. By not contributing to the War against the *K. de jure*, they would satisfy their old Oaths; and withal by not contributing to the Restoration of the *K. de jure*, they would satisfy their new Oaths to the *K. de facto*. But it is strange how they can fall into such a mistake as this is. There is no doubt but the Possessor, whoever he be, will never be content with a bare Neutrality, but will expect active assistances from his liege Subjects, and this by virtue of their Allegiance and their Oaths. If they do not serve him in their own persons, they must at least do it by their Contributions for the maintaining others to do that duty for them. And what reason can they give, why Allegiance sworn to a *K. de facto*, should signify more, than the same Allegiance when sworn to a *K. de jure*.

But let us lay aside the Opinions of Men, and consider nakedly the things themselves. The things sworn in both Oaths are Fealty,

and Allegiance, Terms taken from the barbarous Feudal Laws; and with them most certainly signifying, not a Neutrality, but an active Contribution. *Fendum* among them, upon which the Oath of Fidelity was grounded, signified a Tenure of Lands by the Beneficiary from the favour of the Benefactor, the Liege Lord, on which account the Tenant became his Liege-man or Vassal. And can we think that all this Endearment and Obligation was designed to hire them only to a Neutrality? No, it is plain they intended thereby to oblige them to all that gratitude that might in Reason be expected from Persons so beholden to them for their worldly maintenance. The Duty was very much the same as between the *Liberti* and the *Roman* Patrons. For here, as well as there, was allowed an action of Ingratitude only with this difference, that whereas, among the *Romans*, the Person convicted of Ingratitude was reduced into his former state of slavery, here the Tenure, which alone was servile, the Person being free, was forfeited on that Conviction. The Vassal therefore was obliged to help his Lord in all wars wherein he thought the Cause was just, or at least, doubted whether it might not be so. This in case of offensive Wars. In defensive wars he was to help him, whatever the Cause was, without Exception. Nay, if the Lord were besieged, and by that means disabled to protect him, the Vassal was yet obliged to use all his endeavours to restore him to his liberty. If he did not, that was also an Ingratitude that forfeited his Tenure. And therefore the doing of it must undoubtedly have been a condition of it, and therefore a particular of the Oath he was to take to his Liege Lord for the performance of Conditions. This was the case in those Feudatory Tenures for which the Feudal Laws in the Body of the Civil Law were framed by the Modern Empire. Much more of the Fees depending on the Emperor himself, from whom these

inferior Feudal Lords derived their Authority, and that with a particular exception of such cases where in they might any way interfere with it. And certainly the Rights of the Empire by these barbarous Feudal Laws are common to the Emperour with all other Sovereign Princes where the same Feudal Laws have obtained, (as they have done generally in these Northern Countreys) but most especially to such as those of our Kingdoms whose very Crowns are called Imperial.

Fealty in the new Oath is called Faith, and so it is by the Feudalists themselves with particular regard to the Etymology of *Fendum*. As if this Fealty were essential to the very notion of Feudal Tenure. But it is certain this Fealty required more than an empty Neutrality. So the Collector of the Books *de Feudis* tells us in express Terms: *ib. tit. 6. Sed quia non sufficit abstinere à malo nisi fiat quod bonum est, restat ut in sex prædictis* (what those are may be seen in the place) *consilium & auxilium Domino præstet, si beneficio vult dignus videri, & de Fidelitate esse saluus.* And it appears in all the particulars promised and sworn to, in all the Oaths of Fealty and Allegiance. Such are the concealing all the secrets of the Lord, and discovering all conspiracies against him. Such are also the maintaining and defending his life and limbs and terrene honour. These things are generally expressly mentioned in all the Oaths of those times, in all the places and Nations where ever the Feudal Laws obtained, by which we may easily gather that they are not singular cases separable from the Nature of Feudal Tenure in general. And therefore where ever Fealty and Allegiance are promised and sworn in general, without any express mention of any particulars; As we cannot be so absurd as to think no particulars are intended, (which would make the whole Oath insignificant) so neither can we doubt,

*Feud. 1.
11. tit. 7.*

*Feud. 1.
11. tit. 3.*

ib. tit. 6.

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but if any were, these certainly were so. And so it always appeared in practice. Whosoever had sworn Fealty and Allegiance, without mentioning any particulars, was notwithstanding called to an account, and deprived of his Fee, if it could be proved against him, that he had violated any of the particulars now mentioned. And that this maintenance of life, and limb, and terrene honour was meant of doing it in an active way, will the more easily appear, if we consider that this was originally a Military Tenure. It was the Tenure of a *Miles* in that *Italian* collection incorporated into the Civil Imperial Laws. It is Knight-service with us, of the Fensible men, in the Civilian language of *Scotland*. The Feudatory was obliged to keep a Coat of Arms, and to maintain his proportion of Soldiers to be commanded by the Liege Lord, as often as he had occasion for them. This I take to be the original of our Coats of Armour, that used anciently to adorn our Gentlemen's Halls, that they answered the number of Men at Arms, that their Feudatory Tenants were bound to find them, and they to find their Sovereign Lord the King, when required by him. And personal service was generally expected at first, which made it more difficult for Women to be admitted to this Tenure then. However contribution of the Purse towards the Hire of Soldiers to perform the duty for them was indispensibly expected from all. By which we easily understand how far a neutrality is from satisfying the duty of it.

And now it will concern our well-meaning Brethren to consider whether this same Fealty thus explained as sworn to a *K. de Facto*, and a *K. de Jure*, be any way consistent. Is it possible for them to maintain the life and limbs and terrene Honour of the *K. de Jure*, without opposing the *K. de Facto*, at the very time when he deprives the *K. de Jure* of his terrene Honour? whilst he is engaged in an actual War against him, not only to maintain

the Honour he has deprived him of, but to put him also to further hazards of his life and limbs? Will not the Law call all such countenancing the Title of a Rival Prince, and living in his peace, a breach of his peace whom the Law calls our Sovereign Lord the *K.* And will not, on the other side, the same Laws, as expounded by the Tribunals of the *K. de facto*, condemn all peaceable behaviour to the *K. de Jure*, as a breach of the peace of that *K.* for whom they are concerned? And then how can they mean veraciously that they will not disturb the peace, in the sense of the present Possessors? How can they keep the secrets of the *K. de Jure*, against the *K. de facto*, without violating their Fealty, and breaking their Oath, to the *K. de facto*, which (as I have shewn) oblige them to discover all Designs and Conspiracies against him? Or how can they conceal the secrets of the *K. de facto*, against the *K. de Jure*, without breaking their former Oaths to the *K. de Jure*?

This was plainly the nature of this Fealty and this Allegiance in their first originals, that they were Military duties, and therefore perfectly inconsistent with Neutrality, and inconsistent also with themselves when promised to Princes in hostility with each other. And several expressions in the Act of *H. vii.* so much misunderstood of late, seems plainly to imply that this Military Fealty alone was that for which the favour of that Act was intended. Which, if true, will, by the way, cut off all others, who either hold no Lands from the Crown, or hold them not in Military service, from even that Indemnity which seems to be the uttermost favour designed by that Act. Afterwards this Allegiance and Fealty was extended further by the Oath of Allegiance introduced by *K. James the I.* This Oath might be tendered to all Persons living in the Kingdom above Sixteen Years of Age, supposing therefore that even such Persons living in the Realm, under

under the King's Protection, were, on the very account of their enjoying that protection, under the same obligations of gratitude to the K. that the Knights were formerly, though neither Soldiers by profession, nor holding any Lands on that condition from the Crown. This is that which we call usually *natural Allegiance*, due on account of our being born in these Kingdoms, and of those benefits in Law to which we are intitled by being born Subjects, of Purchases, and Inheritances, and benefit of Wills and Testaments, and some liberties of Trading which strangers cannot attain to otherwise than by an Act of Parliament for their Naturalization. And this is the present Notion of Allegiance alluded to in the Act for imposing these present Oaths. They are substituted in the Room of these Oaths of Allegiance, and are therefore required from all persons qualified by Law to take the former Oath of Allegiance, from all persons above sixteen years of Age, though neither Soldiers, nor holding any Military Tenures. This therefore being the Fealty and Allegiance concerned in our present Oaths, we are further to consider whether the duties of them be consistent with a Neutrality between the *K. de Facto*, and the *K. de Jure*?

In order whereunto I consider that the change made in this enlarged Notion of Allegiance is rather in the Motives and inducements on which the Duties are grounded, than in the Duties themselves. In both Allegiances the Liege-man is supposed to be a Beneficiary of a Liege-lord, and the duties thence resulting are also supposed obliging in gratitude for the favours received, not barely on account of the Authority requiring them. Only in the Benefits on which the Obligation is grounded the difference is considerable. In the former case were favours uncommon to all the Subjects, particularly that of a Beneficial Tenement for life. In the latter, only that protection which all

Subjects receive from the Government, and the common beneficial capacities which all free-born Subjects have a Right to on account of their being free-born Natives of the Government. The reason of the Fealty or Allegiance in these two cases is indeed very different, yet the Notion is very much the same. The Obligation, being in both cases due antecedently in point of gratitude, cannot be understood to imply no more than a bare Neutrality, or a duty of not hindering the Benefactor from his Right. But as there are supposed positive favours from the Benefactor to the Beneficiary; so the natural Return that might be expected, in point of gratitude, can be no less than positive and active assistances from the Beneficiary for maintaining his Benefactor in his just Rights. And the same terms of Fealty and Allegiance being made use of for expressing the nature of this new duty of the Subject, without any intimation of any new signification, the most obvious and likely way of understanding them will be to take them in the same sense in which they were used as terms of Art before, as near as the change of the reason, and circumstances in deducing the secondary signification will give leave. Otherwise the words Fealty and Allegiance would not have been mentioned in the late Oaths without instancing in particulars meant by them, if it had not been supposed notorious, what particulars used formerly to be designed by them in their Original signification, and that the same were also intended in this secondary derivative extended one, as far at least as the Circumstances of the Obligated Person will give way. For if the Person be also Military that will go far towards the continuance of the Military obligation.

And if so, then all the Duties of the former Fealty and Allegiance will return in this Natural Allegiance also, and consequently this new

new Fealty and Allegiance will be as inconsistent with a Neutrality as the other was. The Liege-man must here also, not only not oppose, but maintain, the Life, Limbs, and terrene Honour of his Liege Lord. He must also keep his secrets, and discover all Plots and Conspiracies against him. And this new extended Notion of Fealty and Allegiance being introduced by the Laws, it cannot be more Authentically interpreted than by the Laws that introduced it. Whatever the Laws punish as a Breach of Allegiance that certainly the Law-maker intended that it should be included in the Oaths imposed for the securing Allegiance. And whatever the Laws punish as not maintaining the Life, Limbs, and terrene Honour of the Liege Lord, or as a Violation of his Secrets, or as a concealing or abetting Conspiracies against him (which were all of them directly contrary to the duties of the original Allegiance) those things they certainly look on as a violation of Allegiance, and consequently of the Oath imposed by them for the securing that Allegiance. Hence it will follow that whatever the Laws, if they had their course, would punish as Treason, all that must be understood to be contrary to the Promise and Oath of Allegiance. For all forms of Indicting for Treason are, that the Facts concerned in the Indictment are against the Duty of the Subjects Allegiance expressly, or, at least, for depriving the K. of his Royal State and Dignity, which is directly contrary to the maintaining his terrene Honour, which was the principal design of the forementioned Original Allegiance. But is certain that the very owning of another as K. the very abetting him, the holding correspondence with him where it may be avoided, the entertaining him, and voluntarily relieving him, especially after a warning by Proclamation, is always judged and condemned for High Treason whenever Laws are allowed to take their course. Thus a volun-

tary corresponding with Enemies, on either side, is *contra pacem Domini Regis* in the Interpretation of the Law. The Peaceable corresponding therefore with a K. *de facto* set up in opposition to the K. *de jure*, will be a breach of the Peace of the K. *de jure*; and on the contrary, the living peaceably under the Government of the K. *de facto*, will oblige them, by the Interpretation of the Legislative Power under him, to renounce all correspondence with the K. *de jure*, to betray his Secrets, and his Person too, if ever it should come to be in their power to do so, which I am confident our Brethren would abhor to do from their very Souls. To be sure it will oblige them to conceal Conspiracies against him, and many ways to contribute to the depriving, or at least, to the detaining his Right from him. This will certainly be the Interpretation of living Peaceably under the present Government, in the sense of those to whom the Oaths are made, and therefore ought to be their meaning also; if they will mean sincerely with the present Government which requires these Oaths from them, and to whom they pretend to give satisfaction by taking them. But then it will concern them highly to enquire further how this will be reconcileable with the Allegiance themselves believe due to the K. *de jure*. Certainly it can never be reconciled, if they will but allow the K. *de jure* the same favour of Interpretation for determining his Rights, which they must be forced to allow the K. *de facto*, whether they will or no. And it would be strange if they should allow him less.

The Reasoning now mentioned concerns all Subjects equally, how far distant soever their Profession may be from being Military. The Practice of the Law and of the Courts does punish these things indifferently in all Subjects, though not Souldiers, as breaches of the duties required by the Original Allegiance. So that is plain, that this new extended Notion of Allegiance may concern

cern Ministers, and Scholars, and others who have no Sword at all, and who cannot therefore be obliged to maintain the Life and Limbs, and terrene Honour of their Liege Lord by the Sword, unless they be otherwise lawfully called to it. But it is certain, the old Military Allegiance did oblige the Feudatory Vassal to maintain the Rights of his Liege Lord by the Sword. And I cannot tell how far the same Obligation may hold still, when the Liege Lord, who has the Right of the Sword, requires and obliges them to use it in his defence. In most of these Northern Nations, from whom the Feudal Laws are derived, the Arrierban may be called by the Sovereign Power in distress, wherein all Subjects are concern'd who are any ways capable of Military Service. Answerable whereunto, we have here our Ancient Laws of the Standard, which whether they oblige all Subjects personally, especially since the settlement of the Militia, perhaps in lieu of them, I leave to them to determine who are better skilled in our common Law. For our present purpose it is sufficient that, even to men who are not concerned in the Sword, there are so many interfering Duties between a *K. de jure* and a *K. de facto*, as that it is impossible they can ever be obliged to them both by Oaths. Especially on their Principles who think themselves obliged to their Allegiance to the *K. de jure*, notwithstanding the Possession of the *K. de facto*.

I might content my self with this Reasoning, from the Principles of the Persons with whom I am at present concerned. And I am sure this must be the sense of as many as take the Oaths on Bishop Sanderson's Doctrine, so much of late urged on this occasion. He plainly denies all disobligation from their old Allegiance, notwithstanding the Possession of another, and by no means allows any sideing with the Possessor *de facto* against the Rightful Prince, which yet must needs be understood to be the principal

reason of imposing and requiring these Oaths in this particular juncture. I add farther, that this very Principle seems to be granted them by the Imposers themselves. What can they else mean by the distinction they so much insist on between the *K. de facto* and the *K. de jure*, but that the Possessor is so a *K. de facto*, as that he is not also a *K. de jure*; and that the *K. de jure* is the only *K.* in Right, though he be not in Possession? And when they plead the Laws which own, as they say, this distinction: that, sure is more than arguing *ad homines*. And what can they mean less by it than, that the Laws do also not own such a Possessor for a Rightful *K.*? He is a pretended *K.* indeed and not in Right. This is the very language of the Statute of *Edw. IVth.* concerning his rival Predecessors of the *Lancastrian* Line. This being therefore granted by the Imposers, that the excluded *K.* is the Rightful *K.* how can they avoid our Brethrens consequence, that Allegiance must still be due to him? And, it being on the other side, granted, that the Possessor is, in the Law, a pretended *K.* indeed, and not in Right; how can they possibly defend the giving him the Rights of him whom they own for their Rightful *K.* and confirming that gift by a Promise and an Oath, against so many antecedent Solemne Promises and Oaths? What can the name of a *K. de jure* signifie but that he has still a Right to the Kingship, or that the *Jura Corona* are still his in Right, though not in Possession? How can they then avoid but that he must still have a Right to the Government, to all the profits and dependences of it, and (above all) to the Fealty and Allegiance of his Subjects? And what reason then can they have to be angry at our Brethren, for drawing just and unavoidable Consequences from Principles already given by themselves? And is it not a strange thing, that at the same time they should understand the words, due Allegiance,

in the Act of *H. vii.* of a truly due Allegiance, and not only of such a one as will be judged due by the Possessor? How can any thing be truly due to him who has no Right to it? Or how can he have a Right to that Allegiance, which is only the Right of lawful Kings, who is himself only a pretended K. in deed, and not in Right? What would they say of Wives that should also take Husbands *de facto*, and promise and swear to give them all the Rights of Husbands *de jure*? They may assure themselves such practices of Wives would not be more inconsistent with the Laws of Monogamy introduced by our Saviour, than these repugnant Rights of opposite pretenders are to the essential Law of Monarchy. Thus solidly our Brethren reason from the Principles of our new Legislators themselves, and so little reason have they to desert or suspect those Principles.

The good God awaken the Consciences of Persons concerned in this Dispute, and give a timely stop to that Deluge of Perjury that may prove in the event so fatal to our beloved Churches and Countreys. In vain do we think to save our Protestant Religion by Practices so naturally destructive of all Religion. How can we, for shame pretend Conscience against Popery when secular Punishments do so easily and so universally drive us from our Principles? And what will the Imposters gain by this unhappy victory over

Consciences? The obvious event will be, when the first modesties and Reluctancies of Conscience are overcome, that then all their Tests will be taken, and yet their Trusts will be betrayed, and it will be impossible for them to reckon on the faith of Men. If I might give them my advice, it should have been this, and I assure them I now do it with as hearty a good will to them as any of their Flatterers. Considering their proceedings were directly contrary to the Oaths of the Nations, perhaps it would have been better policy, rather to have taken away the Oaths in being, than to have added new ones, (having made such pretences for Liberty of Conscience) and to have obliged the subject in Interest, by making their burden easier than it had been under K. J. *Interest*, which with ill men would certainly have prevailed more than the Conscience of any Oaths. And it would have so far influenced good men, who had sufficiently discovered their aversion to Popery, that they would not have supererogated in their duty against them, which is more than ever they are likely to gain by their new Oaths, which have disobliged them in point of Interest who think themselves otherwise under no obligation to them in point of Conscience. This may yet be done in some measure, and whether it be not for the common Interest, I leave it to their second and sedate thoughts to consider of.



T H E E N D .

B.